Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
Economic sanctions are a frequently used tool of foreign policy. Aimed at targeting the sanctioned country's economy through restrictions or bans on the trade of certain goods and services, severance of financial ties, or an all-out embargo, the measures are used when diplomacy fails, while military options appear too drastic. However, sanctions also affect the countries that are not directly targeted, including the sanctioning country itself.
Erecting new trade barriers makes the cross-border transfers of goods and money more costly for all exporters and importers-directly or indirectly.
The aim of this chapter is to study the consequence of three recent sanctions cases on international trade. The three case studies are instructive in their own respects:
1. The international sanctions against Iran in response to its nuclear program, in particular those by Western countries, are virtually unprecedented in their severity. The introduced financial sanctions effectively cut off the country from the international financial system and restricted trade seriously, while the ban on imports of crude and refined oil added to Iran's dire economic situation.
Sanctions against the Russian Federation in response to the involvement in the political and military crisis in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea after the "Maidan
Revolution" were less severe compared to the Iran sanction (albeit intensified over time), but hit a country with strong economic ties in the period preceding the events.
3. The sanctions against Myanmar, finally, are instructive in that they represent a case of lifted sanctions. While pre-sanction trade ties against the country were less important and the overall severity of the measures less harsh than in the other two cases, the recovery trade flows (or lack thereof) can be instructive for other cases.
I analyze the impact of these three sanction regimes on bilateral trade between sanctioned, sanctioning and non-implicated countries using a structural gravity setup that allows me to perform a general equilibrium counterfactual exercise. Using quarterly trade data from 48 countries from the beginning of 2010 until the end of 2015, the analysis provides an estimate of the "cost of sanctions". The results highlight the heterogeneous impact of the three sanction regimes, by different sanctioned and sanctioning countries involved.
The use of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy has seen a sustained increase over time, in particular since the end of the Cold War. Figure 1 shows the number of sanctions cases active in a given year since 1945. Naturally, the use and effect of sanctions as a foreign policy tool has attracted a substantial literature in both political science and economics.
The bulk of the existing work has shed light on the determinants of the success or failure of such policies and the effect of sanctions on the target economy through which the 2 A number of papers have looked at the economic impact of sanctions in sender countries.
The case of the Embargo Act of 1807 is particularly well studied, as it provided the first use of sanctions and embargoes in the modern era. Frankel (1982) , Irwin (2005) , and O'Rourke (2007) find effects in the range of 4%-8% of U.S. GDP by looking at trade losses and commodity price changes. Hufbauer and Oegg (2003) look at macroeconomic effects of sanctions in place in the 1990s and find the total effect on U.S. GDP to hover around a 3 much lower 0.4%. Crozet and Hinz (2016) is most closely related to this present chapter.
Crozet and Hinz study in depth the case of the Russia sanctions along two dimension, at the country-and firm-level. They distinguish between those goods that were directly affected by the Russian embargo and those that were not, finding substantial "collateral damage". The general equilibrium framework in this chapter borrows their methodology in estimating "lost trade" due to the sanctions in place.
Other studies look at the economic impact on the target economy. Dreger et al. (2015) evaluate the economic impact of the sanction regime between Western countries and the Russian Federation, estimating the consequences of the sanctions on the Russian macroeconomic performances. Dizaji and van Bergeijk (2013) study the macroeconomic and political impacts on Iran while aiming to quantify the effectiveness of the sanctions' regime.
Also looking at the case of the Western-imposed sanctions on Iran, Haidar (2014) studies the impact of sanctions using firm-level data.
This current chapter is also related to the literature studying the link between conflict and trade. Martin et al. (2008a) and Martin et al. (2008b) analyze the prevalence and severity of interstate and civil wars through the lens of trade economists. They show that multilateral trade openness increases the probability of escalation with another country, while direct bilateral trade deters it. Similarly, small-scale civil wars are shown to be fueled by trade openness while it decreases the probability of large-scale strife. Glick and Taylor (2010) show the disruptive effects of war on international trade and economic activity in general. Their approach relies on a gravity setup and they quantify the losses by accounting for changes in bilateral and multilateral resistances. 1
Another strand of the literature analyzes changes in the consumer preferences following political shocks. Fuchs and Klann (2013) show that high-level meetings with the Dalai Lama are costly for the hosting country, in the sense that bilateral trade with China is significantly reduced in the following year. Michaels and Zhi (2010) In response to insufficient cooperation by the Iranian authorities, in January 2012 the European Union moved to introduce separate, more severe sanctions on the Islamic
Republic. 5 The measures includes further asset freezes and travel bans, most importantly, however, an import embargo on Iranian oil was declared. 6 The next and ultimate escalation The first and second wave of EU sanctions consisted of travel bans and asset freezes on several officials and institutions from Russia and Ukraine, which were implemented through This so-called third wave of EU sanctions went beyond previous measures in depth and scope. Not only were Russian individuals and entities targeted, but European entities were restricted from exporting certain goods and buying certain Russian assets (Dreger et al., 2015 for the production of a range of materiel that includes small arms, mortar shells, and tanks." 14 Other Western countries reciprocated the measures taken by the United States and European Union and enacted similar trade sanctions and financial restrictions (Dreger et al., 2015; Dreyer et al., 2015) . The Swiss government enacted legislation that was meant to prevent circumvention of existing sanctions, while maintaining not to impose direct sanctions on the Russian Federation and as such was not affected by Russian countersanctions (Reuters, 2014) . 15 The Russian side, unsurprisingly, retaliated and enacted sanctions on European and other sanctioning countries. In early August 2014, the Russian Federation imposed a ban on imports of certain raw and processed agricultural products as an "application of certain special economic measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation." 16 The embargoed products are select agricultural products, raw materials and foodstuffs originating from the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia and Norway. 17 In the empirical analysis below I assume that trade relations were impacted by the diplomatic tensions and sanctions measures since the first quarter of 2014. 21 While the Southeast Asian nation had not been well integrated into the world economy-likely in large part due to the political and economic 14 See https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2572.aspx. Additionally, existing "smart sanctions" were extended to more individuals and entities, including the two Ukrainian break-away regions "Luhansk People's Republic" and the "Donetsk People's Republic". 
Theoretical Framework
In order to calculate the lost trade due to the various sanctions measures put in place, I make use of the methodology of Crozet and Hinz (2016) , which extends the previous works by Dekle et al. (2007 Dekle et al. ( , 2008 and Anderson et al. (2016) . The main idea is that using information embedded in observed trade flows, hypothetical trade flows between "treated" countries can be constructed.
Suppose therefore that bilateral trade flows X odt between origin country o and destination country d at time t are described by
where Y ot = d X odt is the value of production in origin country o, X dt = o X odt is the value of expenditure d, and
are the respective outward and inward multilateral resistance terms. I assume sanctions to enter as a component of bilateral trade costs, such that sanction S odt affect trade through changes in τ odt = φ odq e δS odt . φ odq is an exporter-importer-quarter specific characteristic.
Usually one could now go ahead and estimate the average partial effect of sanctions, δ, by specifying S odt as a dummy variable that turns 1 for a "treated" country pair at a time of sanctions. This, however, imposes a certain structural form on how sanctions affect bilateral trade. Instead, following the method by Crozet and Hinz (2016) , I proceed differently here in a way that permits us to be agnostic about the impact. Following
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), I estimate (1) as
using a Poisson estimator and explicitly excluding observations that are treated with sanctions. Ξ ot , Θ dt and φ odq are fixed effects capturing all exporter × time, importer × time, and exporter × importer × quarter characteristics. I let the latter vary at quarterly frequency (i.e. "Q1", "Q2", etc.) in order to control for bilateral seasonal variations, very present in quarterly trade data.
The rationale behind excluding treated observations is the following. Having data for all country pairs (including those "treated") before or after the period the sanctions were enforced, all fixed effects can still be estimated. Hence, given a reference exporter × time fixed effect as well as reference exporter × importer × quarter fixed effects, 23 I obtain values for all Ξ ot , Θ dt and φ odq . 24 23 Which are "dropped", i.e. implicitly set to 0. 24 In effect, the estimation is equivalent to estimating X odkt = log (Ξot + Θ dt + φ odq + β odt · S odt ).
General Equilibrium Counterfactuals
Using the estimated fixed effects from equation (2) allows me to construct counterfactual trade flowsX odt in the absence of sanctions by computinĝ
All terms can be recovered and iteratively computed similar to the procedure described by Anderson et al. (2016) . Current pseudo-production and expenditure figures can be retrieved from the estimated fixed effects aŝ
exp Ξ ot +Θ dt +φ odq and analogouslŷ
while inward and outward multilateral resistance terms can be constructed for any given global trade cost matrixφ q via a contraction mapping algorithm, i.e. iteratively solving the following system of matrix equations: , and ⊗ denotes the elementwise product. 25 Changes in the production and expenditures of exporters and importers due to the new trade costs are computed using first-order price adjustments following Anderson et al. (2016) aŝ
where σ is the elasticity of substitution, which I set at 5 following Head and Mayer (2014) .
The general equilibrium counterfactuals are computed by adjusting production and expenditure figures, as well as the respective inward and outward multilateral resistance terms iteratively until convergence to new equilibrium flows.
Estimated General Equilibrium Impact
In the following I present the results from estimating equation (2) The impact of the sanctions is very heterogeneous across countries. Figures 3a and 3b display the absolute and relative difference between predicted and observed flows (in terms of total exports) by country. A visible positive outlier is Turkey that has, apparently, quite significantly increased exports to Iran over the sanctions period, despite officially sanctioning the Islamic republic. While in absolute terms Germany, France and Korea are affected most, in relative terms Sweden is the most severely affected sanctioning country with a drop in its total exports by 0.39 %. To put this number in perspective, Iran's total exports are 16 % lower than they would be without sanctions. Table 2 shows the aggregate lost trade in absolute and relative terms over the whole time period.
Case 2: Russia
As described above, the sanctions against the Russian Federation are very instructive in that pre-sanction trade ties between sanctioning and sanctioned country were very strong. Figure 4 shows again the predicted and observed flows, here between sanctioning countries and Russia. Figure 4a As in the case of the Iran sanctions, the impact of the sanctions is very heterogeneous across countries. 27 Figures 5a and 5b display the absolute in billion USD and relative losses as a share of predicted total exports by country. In absolute terms Germany and France ($US 4.67 billion) are again most affected, with Poland ($US 4.38 billion) following as third. In relative terms Finland is the most severely affected sanctioning country with a drop in its total exports by 2.45 %. This compares to Russia's total exports being 5.32 % lower than they would be without the sanctions in place. Table 3 shows the aggregate lost trade in absolute and relative terms over the whole time period. 26 Notice also that even for non-sanctioning countries exports decrease in early 2015 due to the tumbling oil price and Ruble (Dreger et al., 2015) . 27 See also Crozet and Hinz (2016) for a further disaggregation into embargoed and non-embargoed goods.
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Case 3: Myanmar
The case of Myanmar is different. Although the case is instructive by observing the end of a sanctions regime in place as described above, econometrically the results are not comparable to the ones from the Iran and Russia cases. Contrary to the previous two cases, I delete observations from before the end of the sanctions. Hence, I effectively compute the "cost" of prolonging the existing sanctions for another quarter or year. Table 4 shows the aggregate lost trade in absolute and relative terms over the whole time period. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I evaluate and quantify the effects of three recent sanctions episodes with
Iran, Russia and Myanmar on exports by sanctioning and sanctioning countries. The "lost trade" due to the use of this tool of foreign policy is significant in magnitude: I find the overall difference between predicted and observed trade flows to total more than US$50 billion in 2014, about 0.4 % of world trade, stemming only from the 3 most prominent sanctions regimes at that time. The analysis builds on recent advances on the literature in international trade on structural gravity equations and perform a general equilibrium counterfactual exercise to predict exports between "treated" country pairs. The methodology rests exclusively on fixed effects, and, using quarterly data on bilateral trade flows, allows me to take short-run effects into account.
The aim of this chapter is to quantify the cost of this frequently used tool of foreign policynot judge their effectiveness in reaching political aims. However, aside from expected significant economic impact on the side of the sanctioned country, I find quantitatively large effects on part of (some of) the sanctioning countries. This impact is shown to be very heterogeneous across countries and sanctions episodes. Overall strong pre-sanction ties and severity measures, unsurprisingly, affect the magnitude of the total effect. However, ceteris paribus, the former tend to increase the burden on the sanctioning countries, while the latter does so on the sanctioned country. A Country-level Data 
